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I
Introduction
It is ironic that in Fred Astaire's final film, Ghost Story, he
played an elderly man haunted by a ghost from his past.' The
apparition, appearing lifelike and real, tormented him about a
youthful indiscretion. The irony arises from the fact that Astaire's
widow, Robyn, faced a similar situation only a few years later. Mrs.
Astaire was also haunted by a ghost of Fred Astaire's past: a very real
image of a young Fred Astaire being used to market a video on how
to "dirty dance."2
This image was but a glimpse of what the future holds for the
film industry. Digital technology now makes it possible to resurrect
actors, like Astaire, from the dead and to manipulate their images
such that they can be presented to an audience as if they were alive
and continuing to make films. Responding to this development, and
at the urging of Mrs. Astaire, the California legislature passed SB 209,
commonly referred to as the "Astaire Bill," which was signed into law
by California Governor Gray Davis on October 10, 1999.! Known as
the "Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act," this new law extends
the period of protection for deceased celebrities' images by twenty
years and, more significantly, protects the use of these images without
the deceased celebrities' families' permission.4 While the law fails to
protect against any unauthorized use of digitally altered film
performances of deceased celebrities, it nonetheless significantly
expands the scope of celebrity publicity rights and presents new legal
issues to practitioners in the entertainment industry.
This article will provide an overview of the digital technology,
which prompted the reform of California's publicity rights legislation.
It will then examine the legal protections available to celebrities in
both the common and statutory law, including California law as it
existed prior to the recent enactment. The article will next trace the
development of the Astaire Bill and compare the bill in its final
1. Ghost Story (Universal Pictures 1981) (Motion Picture).
2. Amy Pyle, New Fight for Celebrities' Heirs Legislation: Robyn Astaire Backs Bill
That Would End Exemptions to the Right to Control the Use of Famous People's Images,
L.A. Times A3 (Mar. 17, 1999).
3. Carl Ingram, Davis Clears Desk by Approving Bill on Juvenile Justice
Legislation: Measure Toughens Penalties for the Worst Young Offenders; Governor
Finishes Work on Many Other Bills, L.A. Times A3 (Oct. 12, 1999).
4. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 998 (S.B. 209) (West) [hereinafter the Act].
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version with the original proposal and its alternatives After an
introduction to the industry economic issues related to celebrity
publicity rights, the article will analyze the Act and assess the
desirability of a law, which extends protections to all digital film uses.
This analysis will include not only a public policy evaluation of such a
law, but also an assessment of how it would affect filmmakers,
celebrities and their business endeavors in the future. Finally, reform
recommendations will be made. Note that while there are a number
of federal copyright law implications arising from the Astaire Bill's
passage, the scope of this article is limited to the law's effect on
celebrity publicity rights.6
II
Digital Imaging Technology
Imagine the next installment in the James Bond film franchise:
David Niven, as Bond, is tracking down his new nemesis, an evil high-
tech international terrorist, played by Marlene Dietrich. He is
distracted by the beautiful new Bond girl, played by Marilyn Monroe,
and must answer to his boss, M, played by Charles Laughton. Or
consider another possible scenario, a remake of the John Waters cult
classic Pink Flamingos in which Marie Dressler plays Babs Johnson,
vying for the title of "filthiest person alive," with James Stewart and
Lillian Gish as her rivals, performing acts so disgusting they cannot be
described in this article. Such casting scenarios, for better or worse,
are now possible with the advent of digital imaging technology, a
process that allows the creation of derivative works from existing
filmed performances.
Traditionally, the manipulation of images originally captured on
motion picture film did not allow precise alteration of the individual
frames. Any alteration would be of a quality that would make it
obvious to the viewer. Relatively recent advances in digital
technology now allow existing films to be scanned and converted into
a digital format. This format makes it possible to alter the images into
an almost seamless new set of images, clear and practically
5. For clarity of presentation and discussion, this article will hereinafter distinguish
between the proposed form of the legislation (which will be referred to as the "bill" or the
"Astaire Bill") and the final version (referred to as the "law" or the "Act").
6. The federal copyright issues, along with other related intellectual property right
issues, could well fill the pages of a novel. For a summary and early analysis of these
issues, see Joseph J. Beard, Casting Call at Forest Lawn: The Digital Resurrection of
Deceased Entertainers - A 21st Century Challenge for Intellectual Property Law, 8 High
Tech. L.J. 101 (1993).
[24:109
imperceptible to the viewer.7 These alterations include the ability to
change not only colors and shapes, but also motion and expression,
leading to the creation of lifelike performances by "synthespians," a
special effects term used to describe synthetic characters created by
means of digital technology.8 Synthespians can include recreations
and reanimations of famous deceased performers, much like those
already seen in television commercials featuring, for example,
Marilyn Monroe in an advertisement for Chanel No. 5 or Fred
Astaire in an ad for Dirt Devil Vacuum Cleaners.
Arguably the most publicized first usage of digital manipulation
in motion pictures took place in Forrest Gump in which several public
figures, including President John F. Kennedy, were shown in
animation with live actors as if they were speaking and acting as part
of the film.9 Another recent use of the technology to resurrect a dead
actor is in a film which won the year's Academy Award for Best
Picture. Because of the untimely death of Oliver Reed, the producers
of Ridley Scott's Gladiator created a virtual version of the actor to
complete his remaining scenes." This use of digital technology is
similar to that made by the producers of The Crow, in which digital
images of the deceased Brandon Lee were used to finish his scenes in
that film when he died prior to its completion." The technology thus
has both creative and practical value, enabling studios to enhance
films as well as to complete films they may otherwise abandon
following the death of a key actor.
Although there is debate about how soon the process will be able
to create truly seamless new performances of deceased actors, the
consensus is that the capability is there, and the realization is in the
near future.12 At least one company has already been founded with
7. See Gerald 0. Sweeney, Jr. & John T. Williams, Mortal Kombat: The Impact of
Digital Technology on the Rights of Studios and Actors to Images and Derivative Works, 17
Ent. & Sports Law 1 (Spring 1999). This article provides an excellent overview of the
digital imaging process. In basic terms, the digitalization process involves the assignment
of a series of numerical codes to each pixel, the smallest component of an image. Software
allows a programmer absolute freedom to manipulate the appearance and location of any
pixel within the image. Id. at 17 n. 3. For a more in-depth description of the technology
and process, see Erin Giacoppo, Note, Avoiding the Tragedy of Frankenstein: The
Application of the Right of Publicity to the Use of Digitally Reproduced Actors in Film, 48
Hastings L.J. 601 (1997).
8. Sweeney & Williams, supra n. 7, at 17 n. 6.
9. Forrest Gump (Paramount Pictures 1994) (Motion Picture).
10. Brian Logan, Things to do in Hollywood When You're Dead, Guardian (Sept.
17, 1999).
11. Giacoppo, supra n. 7, at 607.
12. Id. at 607-08.
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the express purpose of creating "photo-realistic" animated human
versions of Hollywood film legends: Virtual Celebrity Productions
unveiled an animated version of Marlene Dietrich in 1999.'" This
company's clients include the estates of not only Dietrich, but also of
Clark Gable, W.C. Fields, James Cagney, Bing Crosby, Natalie
Wood, Vincent Price, Sammy Davis, Jr., and George Burns.4 From
these estates, Virtual Celebrity Productions has secured the rights to
produce digitally reconstructed film performances, a process the
company calls "photo surrealism." 5 While the company does not
believe its stars will be ready for cameo roles for another two years,
or for full-length feature performances until 2004,6 an action film
starring a resurrected Bruce Lee is already in development.
7
Despite the hoopla, the technology is not yet as advanced as
would be needed to create seamless digital acting performances by
the likes of Bette Davis, for example. The process of creating such
characters is highly capital and labor intensive, and the present
market is small. 8 Much of the complexity arises from the
"keyframing" of the human face, especially when one must create
facial expressions, which are distinctive and well-known to
audiences.19 Inexpressive actors are the easiest to recreate digitally,
while actors with more expressive faces are too complex for the
existing technology. Thus, either fully computer generated
synthespians or action figures like Bruce Lee and Steve McQueen are
more likely to be seen in theaters in the near future. ° It appears that
fans desiring to see Ingrid Bergman or Spencer Tracy will have to
wait a few more years.
13. Stephen Porter, The Fine Art of Character Animation, Video Sys. (Nov. 30,
1999).
14. Logan, supra n. 10.
15. Chris Reed, Synthespians: Return of the Living Dead?, Globe & Mail C1 (Aug.
18, 1999).
16. Id.
17. Logan, supra n. 10.
18. Porter, supra n. 13 (in an interview with Jeff Lotman, founder of Virtual
Celebrity Productions).
19. Id. Virtual Celebrity Productions' Marlene Dietrich, although it captured her
essence, did not replicate her screen image. Reed, supra n. 15.
20. Logan, supra n. 10.
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III
The Common Law Right of Publicity
A. Its Scope and Limits
When digital technology is used to alter the performances of
deceased personalities, it comes into direct contact with their
publicity rights. The right of publicity has existed in some form in this
country for almost a century. The origin of this right can be traced to
its close relative, the right of privacy, which has been described as the
right to an inviolate personality that would protect characteristics
"whether expressed in writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in
attitudes, or in facial expression."2 Many of the privacy rights cases
early this century focused on whether a person's name or likeness
could be protected. 3 While these cases would today probably be
considered publicity rights cases, at the time they fell under the rubric
of privacy rights.
The first court-recognized publicity right did not appear until
1953. The Second Circuit, in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., declared a right of publicity, based on the
"common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors
and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through
public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they
no longer received money for authorizing advertisements,
popularizing their countenances."2 This particular type of publicity
right relates to the identification value of a celebrity or personality.
The Supreme Court weighed in on the right of publicity when it
recognized another type of publicity right, that of performance value.
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the court
distinguished a performer's right to the economic value of his
performance as a separate right from his identification value.25 "[T]he
21. See Paul C. Weiler, Entertainment, Media, and the Law 160-70 (1997), for a
discussion of the evolution of publicity rights. Weiler defines the right of publicity as the
right to control one's identity for commercial purposes, and he traces the evolution of this
right to the 1903 enactment of Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law,
making it unlawful to use the name or picture of a living person for commercial purposes
without their consent. Id. at 160-61.
22. Giacoppo, supra n. 7, at 610 (quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L.Rev. 193 (1890)).
23. See e.g. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538 (N.Y. 1902); cf.
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190 (Ga. 1905).
24. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953).
25. 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
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broadcast of petitioner's entire performance, unlike the unauthorized
use of another's name for purpose of trade or the incidental use of a
name or picture by the press, goes to the heart of petitioner's ability
to earn a living as an entertainer."26
The result of these cases is a definition of the right of publicity
which indicates the right of a celebrity or public figure to "control the
commercial value and exploitation of his name and picture or likeness
and to prevent others from unfairly appropriating this value for their
commercial benefit."27 The scope of the right, which began as a
narrow set of protections for one's name and likeness, has been
expanded over time to include voice, professional characteristics, 29
style of performance,3" phrases,31 and even the evocation of a
celebrity's image. 2
Publicity rights are limited, of course, by the First Amendment
and the protections of freedom of speech and of the press. Thus,
celebrities and public figures may not enforce their publicity rights in
news stories,33 biographical presentations,
34 or parodies and satires3
that use their identities. However, if the use of the identity is purely
commercial in nature, fewer First Amendment protections apply, and
a claim for violation of the right of publicity will prevail.36 In the case
of performance value claims, the protection is limited by the amount
of originality, creativity, and newsworthiness of the performance.
26. Id.
27. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp 1339, 1353 (D.N.J. 1981).
28. See e.g. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
29. See e.g. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.
1974).
30. See e.g. Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
31. See e.g. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
1983).
32. See e.g. White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that a robot which merely reminded the public of Vanna White violated her right of
publicity).
33. See e.g. Corabi v. Curtis Pubig. Co., 441 Pa. 432 (Pa. 1971).
34. See e.g. Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994).
35. See e.g. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal.3d 860 (1979).
36. See e.g. Carson, 698 F.2d at 831.
37. See Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1356. The court indicated that if the
portrayal contributes to the public debate of political or social issues or to society's
cultural enrichment, as long as the portrayal is not false or defamatory, it will generally be
immune from liability. If the primary function is commercial exploitation, however, the
immunity disappears.
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B. Rights of the Deceased
Most of the publicity rights cases thus far have involved living
celebrities. The issue of the right to publicity for deceased celebrities
has only recently been addressed by courts and legislatures. An early
case addressing the issue is Price v. Hal Roach Studios in which the
Southern District of New York recognized the descendibility of such
rights, based on the fact that they were assignable.38 On the other
hand, the Supreme Court of California initially declared that the right
of publicity expired upon the death of the celebrity and was not
descendible.39 In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, the heirs of Bela Lugosi
sued for unauthorized commercial exploitation of Lugosi's identity in
the Count Dracula role."° They lost the case because the court would
not allow the right of publicity to descend when the celebrity did not
exploit his identity for commercial purposes during his lifetime.4
Even in the aftermath of the enactment of California Civil Code
Section 990 (discussed infra), this decision would likely stand because
Lugosi had assigned his publicity rights in the Dracula character to
41the studio as part of his film contract.
The Lugosi reasoning was later applied to the estate of Elvis
Presley, a celebrity who had exploited his identity during his
lifetime.43 In Estate of Presley v. Russen, the New Jersey district court
held the defendant liable for copying and performing Presley's stage
performances, concluding that the publicity right was descendible
because it had been exploited by Presley. 44 In addition, because the
defendant's performance had neither its own creative component nor
a significant independent value as entertainment, the freedom of
expression claims were outweighed by the estate's right of publicity
claim.45
By contrast, if a deceased celebrity's performance is used as part
of a biographical portrayal, courts are less likely to find a publicity
right violation. In Joplin Enterprises v. Allen, no violation was found
in a play depicting a day in the life of singer Janis Joplin, which
included a concert performance. 46 Because the concert performance
38. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
39. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 313 (1979).
40. Id at 313.
41. Id. at 314
42. Id. at 314 n. 2.
43. Weiler, supra n. 21, at 175.
44. Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1359.
45. Id.
46. 795 F. Supp. 349, 351 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
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was part of the protected expression in the entire play, it was likewise
exempt.47 The Joplin court refused to analyze the use of the concert
performance as separate from the context of its use within the play."
Thus, if a performance is one part of a newly created artistic form of
expression and is not included primarily for commercial exploitation
purposes, the First Amendment limitation on the right of publicity
will likely be applied.
Set against the backdrop of these holdings, the Supreme Court of
Georgia addressed the issue of publicity rights for the deceased in
Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Products, Inc.49 Relying primarily on the holding in Estate of
Presley v. Russen, in which the Presley court quoted from the dissent
in Lugosi,50 the Georgia court held that the right of publicity survives
the death of the owner, and is both inheritable and devisable. 1 The
Georgia court seemed to be especially concerned with those who
would reap unauthorized profits from the fame of a celebrity after
their death. 2 Therefore, the court held that the owner of the right of
publicity need not have commercially exploited the right in order for
it to survive their death." Here, the court reasoned that a person who
avoids exploitation during life is entitled to have his image protected
against exploitation after death, perhaps even more so than one who
exploited his image during life."
While Georgia allows the right to descend regardless of
exploitation during one's life, in several other states the common law
rights of publicity depend on whether the right was exploited.5 As
these cases illustrate, the common law right of publicity is far from
uniform. In the statutory arena, however, the disparity seems even
47. Id. at 351.
48. Id.
49. 250 Ga. 135 (Ga. 1982).
50. Chief Justice Bird's dissent was quoted, in part, as follows: "There is no reason
why, upon a celebrity's death, advertisers should receive a windfall in the form of freedom
to use with impunity the name or likeness of the deceased celebrity who may have worked
his or her entire life to attain celebrity status. The financial benefits of that labor should go
to the celebrity's heirs." Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1355.
51. King, 250 Ga. at 143.
52. Id. at 143-44.
53. Id. at 144.
54. Id. at 144.
55. Arizona and New Jersey require exploitation for the right to continue post-
mortem. See Sinkler v. Goldsmith, 623 F. Supp. 727, 734 (D. Ariz. 1985); Gleason v.
Hustler, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2183 (D.N.J. 1981). Several other states have more
ambiguous common law descendibility holdings. See e.g. Cepada v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d
1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
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C. Statutory Right of Publicity
Only eighteen states have enacted legislation recognizing some
form of a right of publicity. 6 The most recent additions to this group
are Illinois and Ohio, which respectively enacted statutes in July and
September of 1999.17 Other states, such as Georgia, rely mainly on
case law to define and limit the right and its scope." As would be
expected, the various states' statutory definitions are widely
disparate. The publicity right protections vary in terms of degree and
length of time. For example, while all of the states protect the
person's likeness, not all of them protect the voice or signature. 9
Some states limit the right to only the performer's name and likeness,
while others have expanded the right to include signature, voice,
appearance, distinctive mannerisms, gestures and other identifying
characteristics that make up a celebrity's persona. 6 This state
expansion of protection mirrors the manner in which the common law
protections developed, as described in the preceding section. The
right expires upon death in many of the states."
A post-mortem right of publicity is currently recognized in
relatively few states by either statutory or common law. While
eighteen states have publicity rights legislation, only twelve have
legislation specifically recognizing publicity rights for deceased
personalities.62 In some of these states, the right is descendible only if
the person exploited the right during his lifetime, while others allow
the right to pass regardless of self-exploitation.63 The terms of the
post-mortem rights vary from a low of ten years to a high of one
hundred years, or perhaps even in perpetuity: Tennessee has a statute
that could potentially make the rights indefinite.'
56. Currently these states are California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
57. See 765 11. Comp. Stat. § 1075 (West 1999); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741 (West
1999).
58. See supra Part Ill(B).
59. See e.g. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-208 (1983).
60. See e.g. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
61. See e.g. Sharman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 216 F. Supp. 401 (E.D.Pa. 1963).
62. These states are California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska,
Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
63. See e.g. King, supra n. 49.
64. The "Elvis Statute" allows for the continuous protection of the right so long as
the right is continuously exercised. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-1104 (West 1999).
20011 CELEBRITY PUBLICITY RIGHTS
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
Two states explicitly deny, by statute, a post-mortem right of
publicity.65 Interestingly, one of these states, New York, was the first
to recognize a right of publicity for living persons."' Nevertheless, its
determination that no such right exists for deceased celebrities has
been upheld by the Court of Appeals.67 California, by contrast,
apparently unhappy with the Lugosi verdict, amended the California
Civil Code to create descendible publicity rights for deceased
persons.68 The rights were limited to commercial uses and excluded
news and entertainment uses other than advertisements. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, none of the states' statutory and common law
provisions address the use of reanimated or digitally manipulated
images of deceased celebrities.
D. California Law
1. Section 990
In the absence of a national publicity rights statute, many courts
and policy makers look to California law for guidance on this issue.
California, the home to the film industry and to a large number of
celebrities from all fields in the entertainment industry, has had much
experience in dealing with celebrity issues. California Civil Code
Section 334469 protects a celebrity's right of publicity, but California
took the further step of protecting the right for deceased personalities
by enacting Section 990, which made it a tort to use a celebrity's
image for commercial purposes." The publicity rights were freely
transferable, but if the deceased personality did not transfer his or her
rights by contract or by means of either a trust or testamentary
document, and there were no surviving family members, the rights
terminated.71 Otherwise, the rights terminated fifty years after the
death of the personality. The statute expressly exempted the use of
the deceased personality's likeness in a "play, book, magazine,
newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program
and material that is of political or newsworthy value. 7 3 Of all the
65. These states are New York and Pennsylvania.
66. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law. §§ 50 and 51.
67. Stephano v. News Group Publications, 64 N.Y.2d 174 (N.Y. 1984).
68. Cal. Civ. Code § 990 (West 1999)
69. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (West 1999)
70. Cal. Civ. Code § 990 (a).
71. Id. §§ 990(b), (e).
72. Id. § 990 (g).
73. Id. § 990 (n).
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states which recognize such rights, California's statute was among the
most comprehensive.
As broad and all-encompassing as the California statute was, it
failed to address new developments such as digital imaging
technology. While living celebrities would arguably be protected
against unauthorized digital representation under Section 3344,74 and
deceased celebrities would similarly be protected against the
unauthorized digital use of their images in advertising under Section
990,7" there remained a gap when it came to the use of digital images
of deceased celebrities in film. The existing statute would have
allowed, immediately upon an actor's death, a digitally reconstructed
performance of the actor in a new film, which a studio could have
made without either obtaining permission from or paying
compensation to the actor's estate." Into this void of protections
stepped Robyn Astaire, the catalyst for reform of California Civil
Code Section 990.
2. The Astaire Case
The reform story actually began over ten years ago. In 1989,
Robyn Astaire, the widow of the legendary dancer and actor, was
flipping through the pages of a mail order catalog when she saw an
advertisement for an instructional dance video captioned "Fred
Astaire Teaches You How to Dirty Dance."77 Distressed by this
unauthorized use of her husband's name and image, Mrs. Astaire
brought suit against Best Film & Video Corporation ("Best"), the
company that produced and distributed the videotape.78 Mrs. Astaire
74. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.
75. For these arguments to prevail, the digital manipulation and presentation of the
celebrities' images must be found to fall under the definition of either a likeness or a
photograph. Given the result in White, in which the court held that a robot could infringe
Vanna White's right of publicity even though the robot was not an exact replica of White,
it seems reasonable to presume that digital imaging would also be found to qualify as
either a likeness or photograph. 971 F.2d at 1395.
76. This result would depend in part on how courts would interpret the digital
performance. If, like the court in Presley, the performance is found to have little original
creative or cultural enrichment value, but is primarily commercially exploitative in nature,
the actor's estate would stand a better chance of prevailing on a claim for infringement of
the publicity right. 513 F. Supp. at 1356. The more likely result, however, is like that in
Joplin, 795 F. Supp. at 351, as the digital reproduction of an actor's performance is but a
part of a new creative expression (a film), which must be viewed as a whole, and is most
likely protected by the First Amendment.
77. Pyle, supra n. 2.
78. Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp., 116 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 161 (1998).
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sued under California Civil Code Section 990, which prohibited,
among other things, the use of a deceased personality's name,
photograph, or likeness for commercial purposes without the prior
consent of the deceased personality's heirs.79 Fred Astaire had
entered into an agreement in 1965 with the operators of the Fred
Astaire Dance Studios, whereby he licensed the dance studio
company to use his name and photograph.80 As a result, Best's use of
Astaire's name and photograph were authorized by means of an
agreement Best reached with this license holder.8 Thus, Mrs.
Astaire's claim was reduced on appeal to the issue of the
unauthorized use of film clips from two of Astaire's films, which
appeared in the video.82
Mrs. Astaire won a district court judgment in her favor, which
was appealed to the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals.83 The Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court judgment, holding that Best's use of
the Astaire film clips was exempt from liability under Section 990
(n).' Subsection (n) exempted from liability the use of a deceased
79. The relevant sections of the statute read as follows:
(a) Any person who uses a deceased personality's name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products,
merchandise, or goods, or for the purposes of advertising or selling, or
soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or services,
without prior consent from the person or persons specified in
subdivision (c), shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person
or persons injured as a result thereof... (h) As used in this section,
"deceased personality" means any natural person whose name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness has commercial value at the time of
his or her death... (i) As used in this section, "photograph" means
any photograph or photographic reproduction, still or moving, or any
video tape or live television transmission, of any person, such that the
deceased personality is readily identifiable ... (n) This section shall
not apply to the use of a deceased personality's name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any of the following instances: (1) A play,
book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or
television program, other than an advertisement or commercial
announcement not exempt under paragraph (4). (2) Material that is of
political or newsworthy value. (3) Single and original works of fine art.
(4) An advertisement or commercial announcement for a use
permitted by paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
Cal. Civ. Code § 990.
80. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1299.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1300.
84. Id. at 1304.
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celebrity's photograph or likeness in films and television programs.
The court adopted an interpretation of this section to include
videotapes within the meaning of "film." Satisfied that this meaning
also comported with legislative intent, the court held that Best was
not liable.87 Even though the court acknowledged that Best placed the
film clips in the videotape for the obvious purpose of making them
more salable, it found no basis for treating this use of the film clips
differently from the use of the clips in a documentary about dance, a
usage which would clearly be exempt from liability.
In her dissent, Justice Schroeder cautioned that under the
majority's reasoning a company could, without incurring liability
under Section 990, sell a videotape on fashion by introducing it with
footage of Jacqueline Kennedy, an exploitation the statute was clearly
intended to prevent.89 Nevertheless, the case ended when the United
States Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari.' Undaunted by the
setback, Mrs. Astaire continued her ten-year battle to change the
California law which allowed Best to use Astaire's film clips without
either permission or remuneration.
E. Calls for Reform
Given the lack of protection afforded deceased celebrities, which
the Astaire verdict illustrated, calls for the reform of Section 990 were
sounded throughout the 1990's. Concerned by the court's ruling and
the larger implications of digital appropriation of their images, a
number of celebrities and their families became involved in the
legislative reform movement.9' Mrs. Astaire, along with other
celebrities and their relatives, called for the removal of the
exemptions in the then-existing law in order to provide the same
85. Cal. Civ. Code § 990 (n).
86. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1301-02.
87. Id. at 1304.
88. Even if the clips were considered advertisements for the rest of the videotapes,
they would be considered exempt because the videotapes fell under the exemption for
films. Fred Astaire's Widow Loses Right of Publicity Suit against Producer of Instructional
Dance Videos That Contain Clips from Two Movies Showing Astaire Dancing, 19 No. 5
Ent. L. Rep., 13 (1997).
89. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1304 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
90. Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp., cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 161 (1998).
91. Mrs. Astaire, along with Bela Lugosi, Jr., who holds the rights to the image of his
father as well as those of the Three Stooges, testified before the California Senate
Judiciary Committee in March, 1999. Pyle, supra n. 2. Mrs. Astaire also cited support from
the Directors Guild of America and several prominent actors, including Jack Lemmon,
Bob Hope, and Arnold Schwarzenegger. Prominent People Have Rights Too! PR
Newswire (July 7, 1999) (available in CIS State Capital Universe).
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protection against unauthorized commercial use of deceased
celebrities' images. While their concerns were motivated at least in
part by monetary considerations, these individuals were also trying to
protect the goodwill of their celebrity personae, images that were
developed over a lifetime of work in the public. As Mrs. Astaire put
it, her husband's name was comparable to the Good Housekeeping
Seal of Approval.92 This goodwill was an intangible value in need of
greater protections. Living celebrities got in on the "Act," as well.
Janet Leigh testified before the California senate, arguing, "[m]y
image is my product, my franchise, my commodity." 93 Others
supporting the bill were Tom Cruise, Michael Douglas, and Rod
Steiger.94
Joining the celebrities and their families in sounding the need for
reform were academics and practitioners.9 Citing economic as well as
public policy arguments, these reformers believed the California
legislature should proactively address the difficult issues posed by the
capabilities of digital technology.9 At a minimum, they sought the
same protection currently provided under Section 3344 for living
celebrities. 97 Still others called for a national publicity rights statute.98
One California Assemblyman cited the need for a national statute as
his reason for voting against the Astaire Bill. 9
F. Astaire Bill Development
Thanks largely to the reform movement begun by Robyn
Astaire, the Astaire Bill was introduced into the California legislature
in 1999.'00 The bill was originally drafted so as to delete the list of
92. Pyle, supra n. 2.
93. Quoted in Jeff Wilson, California Leads Way in Protecting Dead Celebrities from
Unauthorized Resurrection, Associated Press St. & Loc. Wire (July 8, 1999).
94. Kathy De Salvo, Senate Bill Protecting Dead Actors Clears Hurdle, Shoot (Apr.
30, 1999).
95. For a detailed proposal for the amendment of § 990, see Giacoppo, supra n. 7.
96. The issues and arguments raised included the desire to allow the families of
deceased celebrities to have some input and control over if, when, how and in what
context their relative's image is presented to the public, as well the desire to provide for
compensation to these families and to prevent unjust enrichment on the part of film
producers who may use the celebrities' images for personal gain. Id. at 603, 608.
97. Id. at 618.
98. Beard, supra n. 6, at 106, 157. The Screen Actors Guild also called for a federal
right of publicity. De Salvo, supra n. 68.
99. Paul Bond, "Astaire Bill" Moves Closer to Passage, Portland Oregonian F05
(June 25, 1999). Dick Ackerman believed the issue was better addressed at the federal
level, as each state should not have a different policy.
100. Supporting Players: Sacramento Lawmakers, Cal. J. (July 1, 1999).
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exemptions from Section 990 (n)."°1 It instead specified that a
deceased celebrity's name or image could not be used commercially
without the heirs' permission even if it is used in an otherwise
protected medium, such as a film. 2 However, the restrictions on the
use of the images would not override any protections of such use by
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of
the press. These constitutional protections notwithstanding, the bill
met fierce resistance from the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") and the California Newspaper Publishers Association
over the First Amendment issues.'3 In an editorial, the San Francisco
Chronicle called the bill "legislative overkill," saying that it went
beyond protecting assets and privacy and would hinder the freedom
to think, speculate or compose.'" The Los Angeles Times chimed in,
worried that even docu-dramas could be found in violation of the law,
even if they did not damage the reputation or commercial value of the
celebrity's image.
Other opponents included major studios, film and television
producers, television networks, newspaper publishers and civil
libertarians.'Y6 The bill was strongly supported by the Screen Actors
Guild ("SAG"). 7 SAG, along with the Consumer Federation of
California, believed the proposed law would protect actors' legacies
and keep the public from being misled."0 With the movie studios on
one side of the issue and the actors' union on the other, it was unclear
whether the measure would prove to be good or bad for the
entertainment industry as a whole.' °9
The debate over the measure was fairly heated. At one point,
Mrs. Astaire issued a press release to answer the criticisms of both the
101. Bill to Protect Rights of Heirs of Celebrities Clears Senate, Metropolitan News-
Enterprise 8 (Apr. 6, 1999).
102. Pyle, supra n. 2.
103. Bill to Protect Rights of Heirs of Celebrities Clears Senate, Metropolitan News-
Enterprise 8 (Apr. 6, 1999).
104. Proposal Is Out of Step With Free Expression, S.F. Chron. A22 (June 22, 1999).
105. Dancing Around Free Speech, L.A. Times B8 (July 8, 1999).
106. Carl Ingram, Senate OKs Bill to Increase Rights of Dead Stars' Heirs, L.A. Times
A19 (Apr. 6, 1999).
107. Richard Masur, then president of SAG, claimed that the bill would "significantly
improve the rights of all Californians to control the commercial exploitation of their
family member's name and image, while still respecting the important freedom of
expression guarantees inherent in the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment." Bill Sought
by Astaire Widow Passed by Assembly, Associated Press St. & Loc. Wire (Sept. 3, 1999).
108. Dancing Around Free Speech, supra n. 105.
109. Supporting Players: Sacramento Lawmakers, Cal. J. (July 1, 1999).
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film studios and the First Amendment defenders. " ° Dismissing the
charge that the bill would limit creative choices at the studios, Mrs.
Astaire pointed to the existence of the legal protections for living
celebrities, which seems to be accepted as part of the Hollywood
system."' She further noted that less than 1% of all films use
descendible persona rights, and those that do use them in a way that
is incidental to the story."2 Mrs. Astaire directly attacked the studios
for wanting to digitally alter and to manipulate celebrity images in
order to create entirely new performances, which they could
commercially exploit without permission or remuneration."1 3 She
maintained that the Astaire Bill merely sought the same protection
for individual property rights that the studios have for their
copyrights and trademarks."'
In response, the Motion Picture Association of America
("MPAA") emerged as one of the most vigorous opponents of the
bill. MPAA president Jack Valenti charged that the bill would open
the door to claims by heirs of any celebrity used in a limited or cameo
role in a film, especially if the celebrity were portrayed saying or
doing something non-incidental which they did not in fact say or do."5
Valenti even went so far as to claim that filmmakers would be
precluded from hiring actors to portray deceased celebrities in
biographical films."6 Opponents wondered if films such as Citizen
Kane or Schindler's List would have been made had the law been in
effect at the time of their filming (reasoning that the descendants of
William Randolph Hearst and Oskar Schindler would have had
control over the use of their relatives' images). "7
Valenti's objections were overcome by a compromise
amendment to the bil which protected the right to create fiction and
nonfiction creative works, resulting in the MPAA's dropping of its
110. Prominent People Have Rights Tool, supra n. 91.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. As an interesting aside, Mrs. Astaire was personally attacked for pushing the
bill because her motives were attributed to greed. She was alleged to have denied the
Kennedy Center Honors permission to use a sample of Astaire's film clips as part of a
tribute to Ginger Rogers (for which she would not be paid), but allowed his image to be
used in a vacuum cleaner commercial (for which she was paid). Isabella's Ear, St. Net
Capitol J. - Cal. Vol. II, No. 12 (Mar. 22, 1999).
115. David Robb, SAG, MPAA Deadlock on Rights to Deceased, Hollywood Rep., 1
(Aug. 20, 1999).
116. Id.
117. Free Expression New Protections for Heirs of Deceased Celebrities Go Too Far,
Press Democrat (Santa Rosa, Cal.) B4 (July 13, 1999).
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opposition."' In a major compromise, the bill was also amended to
drop the provisions which would have prevented filmmakers from
digitally altering images of deceased personalities."9 The views of the
MPAA, various news organizations, and the studios, that the bill as
originally drafted would have tread on their First Amendment rights
to portray deceased celebrities and historical figures, thus prevailed.
Nevertheless, Mrs. Astaire has vowed to continue the fight for
deceased celebrities and digital imaging technology rights in the
future.'
G. California's New Law
The newly enacted legislation, to be known and cited as the
Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act,21 serves to renumber and
amend the former Section 990.122 The Act primarily resulted in three
major revisions. First, the period of protection governing the
unauthorized commercial use of the names and likenesses of
deceased celebrities was extended.123 Second, the exceptions to this
protection were revised.14 Third, the protections were extended to
any action occurring in California. 5 An additional noteworthy
change requires the Secretary of State to post all filings of claims as
successor in interest to the rights of a deceased personality, along with
the entire registry of all such persons, as well as all registered
licensees, directly on the Internet. 6
118. Adam Eventov, Heirs Hail Bill Protecting Use of Celebrity Images, Bus. Press, 6
(Sept. 6, 1999).
119. The original bill required filmmakers who digitally altered a celebrity's image to
obtain the approval of the heirs of the celebrity, a provision that was dropped in order to
secure the bill's passage. Kathy DeSalvo, California Senate Approves Dead Celebrity
Legislation, Shoot, 7 (Sept. 17, 1999).
120. David Robb, Assembly OKs the Astaire Bill, Hollywood Rep. 6 (Sept. 7, 1999).
121. All references and comparisons to the old and new sections of the California
Civil Code are from Cal. Civ. Code § 990 (West 1999) and 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 998
(S.B. 209) (West).
122. The Act also moved the right of publicity protection for deceased personalities
from Civil Code Section 990 to Civil Code Section 3344.1, adjacent to the right of publicity
for living celebrities. California Enacts "Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act" Amending
State's Existing Right of Publicity Statute for Deceased Personalities, 21 No. 6 Ent. L. Rep.,
18 (Nov. 1999). The complete text of the Act is included in Appendix A to this article.
123. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 998 (g) (S.B. 209) (West).
124. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 998 (a) (S.B. 209) (West).
125. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 998 (n) (S.B. 209) (West).
126. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 998 (f)(3) (S.B. 209) (West).
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H. Extended Period of Protection
The period of protection for deceased celebrities was extended
by the Act from fifty to seventy years,127 making California's period of
protection the longest among all states with the exceptions of Indiana
and Oklahoma.128 Interestingly, because this extension applies
retroactively to any person who has died within seventy years of
January 1, 1985,129 a number of celebrities who died between 1930 and
1950 now have new or extended periods of protection which did not
exist before enactment of the legislation. This group of newly
protected deceased celebrities includes such Hollywood luminaries as
Mabel Normand (died 1930),'13 Lon Chaney (died 1930),"3 Roscoe
"Fatty" Arbuckle (died 1933),132 Will Rogers (died 1935),3 John
Gilbert (died 1936),' Jean Harlow (died 1937), 5 Tom Mix (died
1940),136 Carole Lombard (died 1942),137 John Barrymore (died
1942), 138 W.C. Fields (died 1946),139 Wallace Beery (died 1949),40 and
Al Jolson (died 1950). 41As can be seen from this list, some important
rights to several well-known Hollywood legends are now removed
from the public domain. Their descendants can potentially benefit
from this new law, a fact which has not yet been mentioned in any of
the media coverage of the Act.
I. Revised Exemptions
The old exceptions to the protection afforded by Sections 990
were removed and revised. The revised bill provides "safe harbors" to
127. This extension was attributed to the desire to maintain analogous protections to
that of the federal copyright protection, which was extended from fifty to seventy years in
1998. California Enacts "Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act" Amending State's
Existing Right of Publicity Statute for Deceased Personalities, supra n. 122.
128. Each of these states provides protection for one hundred years following the
death of the celebrity.
129. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 998 (h) (S.B. 209) (West).
130. Gene Brown, Movie Time: A Chronology of Hollywood and the Movie Industry
from its Beginnings to the Present 100 (1995).
131. Id. at 101.
132. Id. at 113.
133. Id. at 123.
134. Id. at 128.
135. Id. at 135.
136. Id. at 155.
137. Id. at 164.
138. Id. at 165.
139. Id. at 183.
140. Id. at 198.
141. Id. at 203.
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protect journalists, filmmakers and historians from defamation
charges. The new exceptions provide that:
a play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition,
audiovisual work, radio or television program, single and
original work of art, work of political or newsworthy value,
or an advertisement or commercial announcement for any
of these works, shall not be considered a product, article of,
merchandise, good, or service if it is fictional or nonfictional
entertainment, or a dramatic, literary, or musical work.'42
This clause is apparently the one drafted to satisfy the First
Amendment critics of the bill. Under this provision, an instructional
video using clips of Fred Astaire's films would be in violation of the
Act, while a nonfictional documentary about dance using those same
clips would not be.'
A new caveat is included, iowever. If a work which falls under
the exceptions denoted in the preceding paragraph includes "a use in
connection with a product, article of merchandise, good, or service,"
such use shall not be exempt as long as the use is so directly
connected with the commercial aspect as to constitute an act of
advertising, selling, or soliciting purchases of that product or service
by the deceased personality without prior consent from the deceased
person's heirs.'" The Act thus requires the heirs' permission if a
historical figure or deceased personality is shown endorsing a
commercial product in a film. 45 This change may have helped Robyn
Astaire in her fight against Best Video.46 However, one analysis
suggests that it would not have helped her case because the Astaire
film clips could only be viewed after the tapes were purchased, and
thus could not have been considered advertisements for the tapes. 4
J. Nationalized Scope
The final major change brought about by the Act is the
possibility of claims under the Act being brought by the families of
deceased personalities who are not domiciled or residents of
142. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 998 (a)(2) (S.B. 209) (West).
143. This conclusion assumes that an instructional dance video is not considered an
entertainment, dramatic, literary, or musical work.
144. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 998 (a)(3) (S.B. 209) (West).
145. DeSalvo, supra n. 119.
146. Robb, supra n. 120.
147. California Enacts "Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act" Amending State's
Existing Right of Publicity Statute for Deceased Personalities, supra n. 122.
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California, provided the violation occurred in California.'48 As long as
the commercial use takes place in California, relatives of a deceased
celebrity who resided in a state with less protection can potentially
avail themselves of the greater protection afforded by California. This
change makes forum shopping an increasingly likely occurrence in the
filing of publicity right claims for deceased celebrities and public
figures, a factor will be considered in the concluding section of this
article.
IV
Industry Economics
Prior to the enactment of California's new law, the standard
practice in the entertainment industry was for filmmakers to negotiate
a fee and to obtain clearance before using film clips or photographs of
a living actor.'49 No such clearance was required for the use of a
deceased actor's image in a non-commercial setting. By lessening the
former exemptions, the Act may impose new economic transactional
costs on the film industry. However, for the most part, studios and
filmmakers retain the opportunity under the Act to capitalize on the
appeal of deceased actors. By carefully utilizing the images of a
deceased personality in a non-commercial manner, producers can
take advantage of the personality without obtaining clearance or
incurring the fees and expenses associated with such a transaction.5
Some critics have posited that this process could lead to the
lessening of fees paid to living actors. 5' The rationale is that if
filmmakers can have free unlimited use of a "resurrected" actor in a
film, they would be less willing to pay higher fees during the actor's
lifetime for something that will eventually fall into the public
domain.'52 This resistance would in turn lessen the actor's market
value while alive. 3
Taken to its logical extreme, however, this argument loses power
when one considers that, unless the actor generated a great deal of
popularity and market value while alive, the free use of his image
after death would be much less appealing to filmmakers. If the actor
148. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 998 (n).
149. Giacoppo, supra n. 7, at 619.
150. In addition to the fees paid to the actor or his heirs, there are transactional costs,
including legal and insurance expenses that increase the amount of the total clearance
expenditure.
151. Giacoppo, supra n. 7, at 622.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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were successful or popular enough, he would be able to demand fees
at whatever amount the market would bear. Powerful box office stars
can also protect themselves by contracting for control of the future
use of their image after death.'54 In addition, studios may fear
alienating such talent and fomenting a movement for a national right
of publicity law, which could eliminate the exception for usage of
deceased personalities' images in film."' Finally, if the studios were to
use the images of the deceased actor to such an extent that he had a
starring or featured role in the film, such usage might not qualify for
the exemption provided by the Act, as it could be argued that the
actor's image was being used to sell or to market the film.
Despite the lack of significant statutory protections, there
already exists a market for the licensing and protection of deceased
celebrities' images. The leader in this relatively new industry is CMG
Worldwide, an Indiana-based company which specializes in licensing
and protecting the images of both deceased and living celebrities and
in representing their estates.'56 The company licenses the rights to the
images of celebrities such as Marilyn Monroe, James Dean, and
Humphrey Bogart.57 The business is quite lucrative, generating
several millions of dollars in licensing fees even before the impact of
the passage of the Act." ' Because makers of commercials often must
obtain both copyrighted film clips from the studios and licenses to the
right of publicity from the heirs of the celebrity, CMG Worldwide
believes it may be in filmmakers' best interests to coordinate with
celebrity estates and thereby maximize their financial rewards from
the use of the deceased personalities' images.59 Thus, it is at least
possible that industry economics may lead to a system of de facto
rights for the families of deceased personalities, regardless of
legislative initiatives such as the Act.
V
Analysis
The Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act introduces an
entirely new ball game to the field of celebrity publicity rights for
154. Sweeney & Williams, supra n. 7, at 21.
155. Id.
156. Wilson, supra n. 67.
157. Greg Johnson, Protecting Dead Icons Back for an Encore: Monroe, Bogart and
Others Now Star in Commercials, Raising Thorny Legal and Financial Issues, L.A. Times,
C6 (Apr. 8, 1999).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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deceased personalities. But is it necessarily a good thing? Should
anyone have a proprietary interest in the images of deceased actors,
and if so, whom? Should the original provisions of the Astaire Bill
protecting the deceased against unauthorized digital appropriation of
their images have been retained? If so, should these new publicity
rights take priority over other social and public policy objectives?
While this section will not provide the definitive answers to all of
these questions, it will attempt to analyze the First Amendment,
public policy, economic, and practical considerations raised by such
questions.
A. First Amendment Concerns
The digital resurrection of actors brings the First Amendment
freedom of expression protection, which encourages artistic creation
and public commentary, into direct conflict with the right of publicity,
which provides that every person can control the commercial use of
their identity.' 6° To the extent that digital imaging of deceased actors
is seen as a commercial use of their image, the deceased celebrity's
right of publicity has been violated. But if this same use qualifies as a
protected form of expression, the upholding of the publicity right
results in an infringement of the constitutionally-protected freedom
of expression. The final version of the Act temporarily avoided this
conflict by providing safe harbors for creative uses of deceased
celebrities' images. 61 However, this inevitable conflict must soon be
confronted, as reformers plan to propose amendments to include
digital imaging protection in films as part of deceased celebrities'
publicity rights.
Would these amendments infringe on the free speech rights of
artists and writers? First Amendment critics of such provisions,
including the ACLU, newspapers, authors and playwrights charge
that these types of additional protections would indeed have a chilling
effect on their right to write about or portray historical figures and
deceased celebrities.1 62 The MPAA and large studios worry that
additional restrictions would stifle creative expression if film
producers, writers, and artists must guess whether a reference or
depiction is protected by the First Amendment.63
While the media and the studios worry about the censorship
160. Giacoppo, supra n. 7, at 602.
161. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 998 (a)(2) (S.B. 209) (West).
162. Robb, supra n. 120.
163. Ingram, supra n. 106.
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implications, the actors and their representatives are concerned about
the exploitation of their economic rights. SAG believes additional
protections are urgently needed because of the ability to "morph" a
deceased celebrity into a live performer,' thus depriving them of
vested commercial rights.' Ultimately the resolution of the First
Amendment issues will turn on whether a particular expression is
primarily commercial in nature. The more commercial an expression,
the less protection afforded by the Constitution."6 The difficulty lies
in the fact that in today's society, the line between commercial and
non-commercial usage is increasingly blurred. In a popular culture in
which, as the dissenting opinion in White v. Samsung indicates, the
line between non-commercial and commercial endeavors is
disappearing, such issues are rife with complications.'67
Perhaps the most pernicious wrong at issue is the
misappropriation of a deceased celebrity's image for commercial
exploitation. As this harm is already addressed by California and
other states, any further protections may go too far to erode free-
speech protections, which benefit both the entertainment industry
and society in general. Entertainment is a business of creative
expression. While the expression side of the equation is holding sway
at the moment, business and commerce continue to raise new
concerns about the rights that must be protected. For the time being,
at least, expression and the First Amendment are winning this battle.
B. Public Policy Issues
The public policy issues do not derive directly from the
Copyright Act, 68 but do relate to the policy considerations behind it:
vindication of economic interests, fostering creative output, and
164. Pyle, supra n. 2.
165. On an unrelated point, SAG's own rules and regulations sadly offer no
protection for the names of its own deceased members: anyone who joins the union today
can change their name to Fred Astaire. A deceased actor's name is unavailable for use by
another actor for only three years after death. An actor who does attempt to use a famous
name after the three year period has expired could face other legal obstacles other than
SAG's rules, however. Robb, supra n. 120.
166. See e.g. Va. St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976)
167. 971 F.2d at 1517. Indeed, as Justice Kozinski concluded, in the entertainment
industry, fun is profit. Id.
168. However, it has been noted that digital technology will allow the creation of a
number of derivative works, which should be copyrightable, given the lack of a significant
degree of originality required for the creation of such derivative works. In this way, the
technology will have a significant impact on publicity rights in the film industry. See
Sweeney & Williams, supra n. 7, at 18.
20011 CELEBRITY PUBLICITY RIGHTS
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
prevention of unjust enrichment.6 9 As with copyrightable works, with
celebrity there is a need to protect the economic interests of
celebrities so that they can reap the rewards of the fame for which
they have worked. This aim is closely related to that of redressing
wrongful conduct by not allowing someone who has not earned a
right to share in the profits of another's fame to be unjustly enriched
through commercial exploitation.
Again, as with copyright, publicity rights are needed to
encourage the creation of intellectual and socially useful works. By
encouraging individual efforts through personal gain, there is a
societal benefit derived from the creative output of talented artists
and authors. There must, however, be a careful balancing of these
interests, as society also has an interest in the free use of expression
and speech. One scholar believes the extension of celebrity publicity
rights protection upsets the delicate balance between the rights of the
famous and the interests of the public that enabled their fame.17°
This balance could also be affected in the area of tort law. There
is concern that expanded protections may make it possible for the
heirs of dead celebrities to sue for damages to the marketability of the
celebrities' image resulting from false news accounts or slanderous
portrayals in films or television programs."' According to the ACLU,
any such amendment would be an attempt to give the deceased a
defamation right, while all other states acknowledge the dead to be
libel-proof.'72 This right would indeed be unprecedented, as American
common law does not provide for a tort of defamation which survives
death.'73 Defamation, after all, implies hurt feelings, which deceased
persons do not have. However, the families of the deceased would
argue that the knowing portrayal of false statements would harm the
commercial value of their relatives' image, and should be actionable
169. See Carson, 698 F.2d at 838-39.
170. Pyle, supra n. 2. In addition, a well known authority on copyright, Professor
Nimmer, has maintained that if a derivative work can be restricted by an actor's right of
publicity claim, state laws would be counteracting the benefits Congress conferred by
passage of the Copyright Act. Sweeney & Williams, supra n. 7, at 21 n. 20 (quoting M.
Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §1.01 [B][3][b], at 1-65). However, at least
one court has concluded that a copyright holder's digital manipulation of copyrighted
material originally made with the performer's consent results in the creation of a
derivative work, and the holder's exercise of that right trumps a performer's right of
publicity claim. See Ahn v. Midway Mfg. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1134 (N.D. I11 1997). For an
analysis of this decision and a similar case, consult id. at 17.
171. Robb, supra n. 120.
172. Id.
173. Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of
Publicity: Is There Commercial Life after Death?, 89 Yale L.J. 1125, 1127 n. 13 (1980).
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for damages. As one critic puts it, "Do we want the dead to have the
same right as the living?"'' The answer may be "Probably not," but
given the valid arguments on both sides of this issue, the answer is far
from clear.
One right the dead arguably should have is some measure of
control over their legacy. Perhaps an actor has a moral right to
determine how his image and performances are used and portrayed
after his death. If he were alive, he could choose which film roles to
take and which directors and writers in whose material he wished to
perform. As one writer has suggested, absent this right, unscrupulous
filmmakers could theoretically create an entire body of posthumous
work using digitally manipulated images of a deceased actor, all in
roles the actor adamantly refused to perform while alive.' The actor
should have the ability to control and to prevent such damaging,
wholesale changes to his reputation and acting craft. This control
could be exercised either through contracts the actor entered with
filmmakers prior to making his films, or through licensing agreements
entered into by his heirs or estate, which could specify the types of
roles or films which are acceptable.
While there is certainly a risk that the estates of certain
celebrities may be unwilling to allow the use of the image of their
relative at any price,'76 such a refusal is their right in a free-market
economy. There will undoubtedly be many estates who will be lured
by both monetary and artistic incentives to strike licensing deals and
allow their relative's images to be digitally recreated. Those who
choose not to do so will simply be invoking their (or more specifically,
their relative's) right, like Garbo, to be let alone.
Critics maintain that Garbo-esque celebrities and any type of
licensing system would cause delays which might mean that older
citizens may not live long enough to see digitally resurrected actors in
their lifetimes. Because these older citizens are the ones most likely to
remember the actors from the era in which they were alive, such long
delays would not be in the public interest.'77 Assuming the public
desires to see deceased actors performing in new films,'78 should this
desire be satisfied in their lifetimes, and should it also depend on the
174. Bill to Guard Celebrity of Dead Stars Advances, Arizona Republic, D4 (June 25,
1999) (quoting California Assemblyman Dick Ackerman).
175. Giacoppo, supra n. 7, at 623.
176. Beard, supra n. 6, at 165-66.
177. Id.
178. The results of a recent poll indicate that 80% of U.S. filmgoers want to see
deceased actors performing in new films. Logan, supra n. 10.
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quality of the digital reanimation, in terms of both physical
characteristics and acting abilities?79 While older citizens are most
likely to remember the resurrected actors from their primes, they are
also the most likely to be offended by performances contrary to the
actor's ability or reputation." It may not be appropriate for the
reanimated actor to be cast in roles inconsistent with their image,
especially in pornographic films. 81 In addition, older citizens would be
disappointed by a poor quality or over-used digital resurrection of
their favorite actors and actresses, an overuse that is likely to occur if
the celebrities' images are available as a public good."'
Critics who maintain that long delays in reanimation would not
be in the public interest seem to overestimate the enthusiasm and
desire of the older filmgoing public to see their favorite actors from
the "golden era" of Hollywood brought back to life. The value and
enjoyment of these actors is in the very performances and films from
the 1930s and 1940s that made them famous. It is in these films that
the nostalgic value inheres. While curiosity about what digital
technology is capable of doing to these actors' images is certainly of
some import, this author does not believe that it is strong enough to
constitute value as a "public interest."
C. Economic Factors
A strong argument for extending economic rights to the families
of deceased celebrities can be found in the dissenting opinion in
Lugosi.'83 Chief Justice Bird opined that granting protection after
death provides incentive for further investment in one's profession,
thus enhancing the value of the publicity right." The descendibility of
this right ensures the celebrity that the benefits and control of the
right will be given to appropriate beneficiaries, rather than providing
a windfall of cost-free commercial exploitation by advertisers. If the
celebrity worked his entire life to attain his status, the financial
benefit of that labor should go to his heirs."'
This same logic could be applied to the usage by filmmakers and
studios of a deceased actor's digitally resurrected image. If
179. Beard, supra n. 6, at 165.
180. Giacoppo, supra n. 7, at 625.
181. Beard, supra n. 6, at 165.
182. The public good problem, also known as the "tragedy of the commons," is
discussed further in Economic Factors, infra Part V(C).
183. Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 446 (Bird, J., dissenting).
184. Id.
185. Id.
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filmmakers can capitalize on a deceased actor's image and popularity
without paying his estate, the actor's estate is being robbed of an
economic right in his identity, which the actor worked to develop
during his lifetime. To the extent the use is commercially marketed
and the value derives from the exploitation of the actor's image, this
usage should be controlled by the actor's heirs. The actor earned the
economic right to this identity, which should pass to his estate rather
than provide a windfall to a studio or production company.186
The counter-argument is that the value of the actor's identity is
not exclusively his, as film making is a creative, collaborative
process." 7 Seen in this way, a writer, director, producer, fellow actors,
cinematographer, perhaps even a press agent, and others all may have
contributed to the market value and reputation of the actor.
Therefore, it may not be equitable to allocate all of this value to the
actor and his heirs.
Allowing an actor's estate to own the economic rights to his
image has also been criticized on the grounds that it will prevent
filmmakers from obtaining the best digitally resurrected actors at the
most affordable prices.'8 While it is certainly true that such a licensing
system would prevent a studio from using Laurence Olivier for free, it
would also prevent the diminution in value of the actor's image so
that both studios and the heirs could still reap economic benefits. This
response is analogous to the economic analysis of the "tragedy of the
commons," in which a public or common good is freely available for
all to use. If the usage is free, the public will tend to overuse the good,
until its value is ravaged, often to the point of becoming worthless.
Circuit Judge Smith, in Matthews, recognized this concept, which he
identified as the value of protecting artificial scarcity. 9
Another economic argument holds that putting reanimation in
the public domain will actually result in higher quality of, and healthy
competition for, digital reanimation of deceased celebrities19
However, this argument ignores the economic forces that will make it
lucrative for low-cost operators (who would not have to negotiate or
pay for licensing fees) to produce cheap versions of digitally
resurrected actors in films that are made strictly for profit. One need
look no further than the direct-to-video market to see that quality is
186. Giacoppo, supra n. 7, at 621.
187. Id. at 622.
188. Beard, supra n. 6, at 165.
189. 15 F.3d at 437-38.
190. Beard, supra n. 6, at 166.
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not a prerequisite to financial viability in the film industry today. By
giving heirs economic benefits and rights to their relatives' images, a
certain minimum level of financial commitment will be required of
filmmakers. While this minimum commitment will certainly not
ensure a basic level of film quality, it will set in place two factors
which will help to increase the chances of a quality production. First,
the filmmaker will have invested a certain amount in the acquisition
of the rights to the actor's image. To make this investment pay off, the
filmmaker will likely devote enough resources and talent to ensure
that the highest quality and best use is made of the image. Second, by
giving the heirs a voice in the process, they too can be selective in
terms of choosing to sell the rights only to those producers whom they
believe will turn out a quality project which would not be inconsistent
with or harmful to the image their relative worked so hard to create.'
Assuming that the public wants to pay as little as possible to see
resurrected actors, another analysis suggests that the exclusion of
reanimation from a post-mortem right of publicity would save studios
licensing fees (and certain transaction costs), which could then be
passed on to the public, better serving the public interest. 92 The flaw
in this analysis is the assumption that any such savings would be
passed on to the public. No matter how low digital technology can
drive the costs, Hollywood accounting can find a way to show that
these films are made at a loss, and studios will therefore point to such
losses as justification that no profits are available to pass along to
consumers in the form of lower ticket or DVD prices.9
A final economic argument against publicity rights for the
deceased is that "bidding wars" for famous deceased personalities in
the film industry would ensue.'9 4 However, the industry knows well
how to fend for itself, as it has been involved in such wars over living
movie stars since the dawn of the studio era in the late 1910s and
early 1920s.
191. For example, Marlene Dietrich's family struggled with the decision as to
whether her digitally resurrected image should be allowed to smoke, even though she
made the cigarette holder a world-famous accessory. The family ultimately decided to
allow her to smoke on-screen, but not to promote cigarettes in commercials of any kind.
Reed, supra n. 15.
192. Beard, supra n. 6, at 165.
193. Infamous movie accounting is well-documented in a number of lawsuits, perhaps
most notoriously in Art Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures, 1990 Cal. App. Lexis 634 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Jan 31, 1990).
194. Free Expression New Protections for Heirs of Deceased Celebrities Go Too Far,
supra n. 85.
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D. Practical Considerations
Given the major studios' resources and access to digital
technology, one could argue that the rights of famous personalities
are inadequate in the digital age. However, should post-mortem
rights of publicity be extended to cover digitally altered film
performances, a host of issues would arise as to the contractual and
statutory limitations on these rights. These issues include the validity
of inter-vivos transfers of the rights to the detriment of the actor (if
done early in his career before he is established and has bargaining
power); uncertainties surrounding the term of the rights (depending
either on the state in which the actor and/or the infringing party was
domiciled or on the state in which the infringement of the rights took
place); and the moral rights concerns with the actor's control over the
integrity of his work.9
A national right of publicity statute would be a viable solution to
address such issues. A national statute could serve to harmonize the
existing conflicts between the various state statutes and common law
rights of publicity, thus both providing for more predictable
protection and also discouraging forum shopping.96 It could further
provide the framework for a consistent approach to the moral rights
and transferability issues.
Before concluding that a national law is the answer, however,
one must consider whether alternative protections are already
available. One protection actors have is the Screen Actors Guild
Codified Basic Agreement ("SAG Agreement"). Section 22 of this
contract, "Reuse of Photography or Sound Track," could be
interpreted to mean that digital manipulation of actors' images or
performances cannot be used without either a separate negotiated fee
or damages of three times the amount originally paid the performer
for the work covering the material used.9  While the studios have
denied such an interpretation, the Screen Actors Guild points to the
fact that the studios routinely both seek permission and negotiate for
the use of existing film footage of actors.99
However, at least one major studio seems to believe it can create
new digital media from its existing copyrighted films without violating
the SAG Reuse Provision. An executive of the studio counters that as
195. Beard, supra n. 6, at 168-70.
196. Sweeney & Williams, supra n. 7, at 20.
197. Screen Actors Guild Codified Basic Agreement § 22
198. Sweeney & Williams, supra n. 7, at 20.
199. Id. at 19.
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long as the technique does not reuse photography of an actor's
performance, but merely the performer's physical characteristics, the
studio has created an entirely new work.200 The studio maintains that
the digital manipulation of the performer's image is not a use of
photography or performance as specified by the SAG Agreement,
and it is quite different from using a clip with identifiable actors from
another film. 2°1 While this studio executive may be confident in such
an assessment, he would be wise to consider the court's holding in
White v. Samsung, which imposed a very liberal interpretation on the
definition of a celebrity's image. °2 This view notwithstanding, as long
as deceased celebrity right of publicity statutes such as the Act
exempt use in film, the families of such performers will not have a
strong legal arsenal with which to fight studio appropriation of their
images through digital manipulation. 3
A major concern over strengthening this legal arsenal is the
suppression of creativity which may result. However, placing limits on
the unfettered use of the images of deceased personalities does not
mean that the creative process is hampered or that the actors' images
will not end up in new works of film. Rather than obfuscating the
creative process, limiting the use of digitally resurrected actors will
merely ensure that the use is consistent with the desires of the actor
through his heirs, and that his estate will be properly compensated.
The limitation may actually enhance the creative process. One studio
finds the process of creating a wholly new digital actor to be even
more creatively stimulating than using technology to merely copy
another actor's performance' Alternatively, the limitation may not
even be necessary in all cases: Steven Spielberg publicly stated that he
will never use digitally replicated actors in his films.05
Of course, there is, as always, the danger of going too far. Some
200. Id. at 20 (from an interview with a studio executive who insisted on anonymity).
201. Id. One must question, however, the value of such an image if it is
unrecognizable as the original actor. Presumably, the value to the studio is in the
recognition of the characteristics of a "name" actor; therefore, one must assume that this
executive expects that the actor will still be recognizable in the digitally manipulated
image portrayed on the screen.
202. See generally White, 971 F.2d 1395.
203. There remain strong economic incentives for a film producer to be the first to
produce a derivative work using a deceased celebrity, and the exemption of film in
publicity statutes ensures at least a limited distribution for such films. Id. at 21.
204. Porter, supra n. 13 (in an interview with Jeff Lotman, founder of Virtual
Celebrity Productions).
205. As quoted from an appearance on CNN's Larry King Live on Dec. 8, 1999,
reported by Lew Irwin, ed., Studio Briefing, (Dec. 9, 1999).
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say the definition of celebrity in the California statute is so loosely
defined as to allow H.R. Haldeman to halt the re-release of All the
President's Men.2"6 Perhaps even the descendants of Adolf Hitler
could prevent future showings of Schindler's List. While neither of
these situations are desirable from either freedom of speech or
educational/historical points of view, it seems unlikely that any such
statute would give rise to legitimate claims which could result in a
historical figure's portrayal being censored.
Finally, there are also those celebrities who do not wish to
commercially exploit their images after death. One would expect
Greta Garbo to be such a celebrity. As the court in King v. American
Heritage Products succinctly concluded, these wishes should be
honored.
VI
Conclusion
Considering the panoply of First Amendment, public policy,
economic and practical concerns in the existing framework of
publicity rights, a national right of publicity statute is needed. A
national law would provide order to the current chaotic patchwork of
state laws, and would resolve the choice of law problem by
eliminating forum shopping. In addition, a national law could be used
to balance the economic and practical issues, which favor greater
protections on the one hand, with the public interest and creativity
concerns favoring less protections on the other.
While California's new law is instructive, an appropriate analogy
to an existing area of law may be more useful in guiding the
development of a national publicity rights law. Although much of the
analysis of the right of publicity focuses on analogies to either
personal rights or property rights, the most appropriate analogy
would be to copyright.' The descendibility of copyright is believed to
provide significant motivational effects in the advancement of
enterprise and creative efforts.2"8 These are benefits important in the
application of the right of publicity, which, as the United States
Supreme Court puts it, has a purpose of encouraging enterprise and
creativity by allowing individuals to profit from their efforts.2 9 A
206. Free Expression New Protections for Heirs of Deceased Celebrities Go Too Far,
supra n. 85.
207. This is also the analogy used by Felcher and Rubin, supra n. 134, at 1129-30.
208. Id.
209. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
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delicate balance must be struck between encouraging creative
endeavors and protecting the constitutional interest in the free use of
information. Copyright law achieves this balance in its fair use
provisions, which allow for certain, limited uses of a creator's work,
which do not constitute an infringement of the copyright."'
Fair use provisions in a publicity rights statute would arguably
protect both the public and private interests in creative endeavors by
carving out a common area in which the results of those endeavors
could be freely used and exchanged. In advocating a national
publicity rights law which takes a fair use approach to the digital
resurrection of deceased celebrities, this author believes that the
interests of both the individual actors and their families, as well as
society and the public at large, can be served and enriched.
As one lawyer put it, "the moment of death should not be the
end of an actor's career. 211 This sentiment is certainly shared by
Robyn Astaire, who continues to fight for the rights of deceased
actors. A national publicity rights law, which addresses the issue of
digital reanimation technology will enable her goals to be realized. So
let the public see whether Scarlett gets Rhett back-and let them see
it happen with Vivien Leigh and Clark Gable on the screen.
210. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 1999).
211. Edward Rosenthal, lawyer for the grandson of Marlene Dietrich, as quoted in
Reed, supra n. 15.
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CHAPTER 998
S.B. No. 209
DECEASED PERSONALITIES -UNAUTHORIZED USE
FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES -PROTECTION
PERIOD
AN ACT to amend and renumber Section 990 of the Civil Code,
relating to deceased personalities.
[Filed with Secretary of State October 10, 1999.]
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
SB 209, Burton. Deceased personalities.
Existing law establishes a cause of action for damages on behalf
of specified injured parties for the unauthorized use of a deceased
personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness for
commercial purposes within 50 years of the personality's death,
except as specified.
This bill would revise that provision to extend the period of
protection from 50 years to 70 years after the personality's death. The
bill would also revise the exceptions applicable to this protection, as
specified, and would state that its provisions apply if any of the acts
giving rise to the action occurred directly in this state. In addition, the
bill would require the Secretary of State, upon the filing of a claim as
successor in interest to the rights of a deceased personality, as
provided pursuant to existing law, to post the document along with
the entire registry of persons filing such claims on the World Wide
Web.
This bill would provide that these provisions may be known and
cited as the Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 990 of the Civil Code is amended and
renumbered to read:
3344.1. (a) (1) Any person who uses a deceased personality's
name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or
in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or
selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or
services, without prior consent from the person or persons specified
in subdivision (c), shall be liable for any damages sustained by the
person or persons injured as a result thereof. In addition, in any
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action brought under this section, the person who violated the section
shall be liable to the injured party or parties in an amount equal to
the greater of seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) or the actual
damages suffered by the injured party or parties, as a result of the
unauthorized use, and any profits from the unauthorized use that are
attributable to the use and are not taken into account in computing
the actual damages. In establishing these profits, the injured party or
parties shall be required to present proof only of the gross revenue
attributable to the use and the person who violated the section is
required to prove his or her deductible expenses. Punitive damages
may also be awarded to the injured party or parties. The prevailing
party or parties in any action under this section shall also be entitled
to attorneys' fees and costs.
(2) For purposes of this subdivision, a play, book, magazine,
newspaper, musical composition, audiovisual work, radio or television
program, single and original work of art, work of political or
newsworthy value, or an advertisement or commercial announcement
for any of these works, shall not be considered a product, article of
merchandise, good, or service if it is fictional or nonfictional
entertainment, or a dramatic, literary, or musical work.
(3) If a work that is protected under paragraph (2) includes
within it a use in connection with a product, article of merchandise,
good, or service, this use shall not be exempt under this subdivision,
notwithstanding the unprotected use's inclusion in a work otherwise
exempt under this subdivision, if the claimant proves that this use is
so directly connected with a product, article of merchandise, good, or
service as to constitute an act of advertising, selling, or soliciting
purchases of that product, article of merchandise, good, or service by
the deceased personality without prior consent from the person or
persons specified in subdivision (c).
(b) The rights recognized under this section are property rights,
freely transferable, in whole or in part, by contract or by means of
trust or testamentary documents, whether the transfer occurs before
the death of the deceased personality, by the deceased personality or
his or her transferees, or, after the death of the deceased personality,
by the person or persons in whom the rights vest under this section or
the transferees of that person or persons.
(c) The consent required by this section shall be exercisable by
the person or persons to whom the right of consent (or portion
thereof) has been transferred in accordance with subdivision (b), or if
no transfer has occurred, then by the person or persons to whom the
right of consent (or portion thereof) has passed in accordance with
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subdivision (d).
(d) Subject to subdivisions (b) and (c), after the death of any
person, the rights under this section shall belong to the following
person or persons and may be exercised, on behalf of and for the
benefit of all of those persons, by those persons who, in the aggregate,
are entitled to more than a one-half interest in the rights:
(1) The entire interest in those rights belong to the surviving
spouse of the deceased personality unless there are any surviving
children or grandchildren of the deceased personality, in which case
one-half of the entire interest in those rights belong to the surviving
spouse.
(2) The entire interest in those rights belong to the surviving
children of the deceased personality and to the surviving children of
any dead child of the deceased personality unless the deceased
personality has a surviving spouse, in which case the ownership of a
one-half interest in rights is divided among the surviving children and
grandchildren.
(3) If there is no surviving spouse, and no surviving children or
grandchildren, then the entire interest in those rights belong to the
surviving parent or parents of the deceased personality.
(4) The rights of the deceased personality's children and
grandchildren are in all cases divided among them and exercisable in
the manner provided in Section 240 of the Probate Code according to
the number of the deceased personality's children represented; the
share of the children of a dead child of a deceased personality can be
exercised only by the action of a majority of them.
(e) If any deceased personality does not transfer his or her rights
under this section by contract, or by means of a trust or testamentary
document, and there are no surviving persons as described in
subdivision (d), then the rights set forth in subdivision (a) shall
terminate.
(f)(1) A successor in interest to the rights of a deceased
personality under this section or a licensee thereof may not recover
damages for a use prohibited by this section that occurs before the
successor-in- interest or licensee registers a claim of the rights under
paragraph (2).
(2) Any person claiming to be a successor-in-interest to the rights
of a deceased personality under this section or a licensee thereof may
register that claim with the Secretary of State on a form prescribed by
the Secretary of State and upon payment of a fee of ten dollars ($10).
The form shall be verified and shall include the name and. date of
death of the deceased personality, the name and address of the
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claimant, the basis of the claim, and the rights claimed.
(3) Upon receipt and after filing of any document under this
section, the Secretary of State shall post the document along with the
entire registry of persons claiming to be a successor in interest to the
rights of a deceased personality or a registered licensee under this
section upon the World Wide Web, also known as the Internet. The
Secretary of State may microfilm or reproduce by other techniques
any of the filings or documents and destroy the original filing or
document. The microfilm or other reproduction of any document
under the provisions of this section shall be admissible in any court of
law. The microfilm or other reproduction of any document may be
destroyed by the Secretary of State 70 years after the death of the
personality named therein.
(4) Claims registered under this subdivision shall be public
records.
(g) No action shall be brought under this section by reason of any
use of a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness occurring after the expiration of 70 years after the death of
the deceased personality.
(h) As used in this section, "deceased personality" means any
natural person whose name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness
has commercial value at the time of his or her death, whether or not
during the lifetime of that natural person the person used his or her
name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness on or in products,
merchandise or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or
solicitation of purchase of, products, merchandise, goods, or services.
A "deceased personality" shall include, without limitation, any such
natural person who has died within 70 years prior to January 1, 1985.
(i) As used in this section, "photograph" means any photograph
or photographic reproduction, still or moving, or any video tape or
live television transmission, of any person, such that the deceased
personality is readily identifiable. A deceased personality shall be
deemed to be readily identifiable from a photograph when one who
views the photograph with the naked eye can reasonably determine
who the person depicted in the photograph is.
(j) For purposes of this section, a use of a name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or
sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign, shall not
constitute a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a).
(k) The use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness
in a commercial medium shall not constitute a use for which consent
is required under subdivision (a) solely because the material
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containing the use is commercially sponsored or contains paid
advertising. Rather, it shall be a question of fact whether or not the
use of the deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph,
or likeness was so directly connected with the commercial
sponsorship or with the paid advertising as to constitute a use for
which consent is required under subdivision (a).
(1) Nothing in this section shall apply to the owners or employees
of any medium used for advertising, including, but not limited to,
newspapers, magazines, radio and television networks and stations,
cable television systems, billboards, and transit ads, by whom any
advertisement or solicitation in violation of this section is published
or disseminated, unless it is established that the owners or employees
had knowledge of the unauthorized use of the deceased personality's
name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness as prohibited by this
section.
(m) The remedies provided for in this section are cumulative and
shall be in addition to any others provided for by law.
(n) This section shall apply to the adjudication of liability and the
imposition of any damages or other remedies in cases in which the
liability, damages, and other remedies arise from acts occurring
directly in this state. For purposes of this section, acts giving rise to
liability shall be limited to the use, on or in products, merchandise,
goods, or services, or the advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases
of, products, merchandise, goods, or services prohibited by this
section.
(o) This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Astaire
Celebrity Image Protection Act.
1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 998 (S.B. 209) (West)
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